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)
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Plaintiffs/Appellants/Cross-Respondents,
)
)
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)
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and BRIAN O’CALLAGHAN, JITINVEST
)
LLC, SPIRIT ELEMENTS, LLC, and TODD A. )
REEVE,
)
)
Defendants/Respondents/Cross-Appellants. )
RESPONDENT/CROSS-APPELLANT’S REPLY BRIEF
Appeal from the District Court of the First Judicial District for Kootenai County
Honorable Richard Christensen, Presiding

Darrin L. Murphey
MURPHEY LAW OFFICE, PLLC
402 West Canfield Avenue, Suite 2
Coeur d’Alene, ID 83815
Attorney for Defendant/Respondent/CrossAppellant Brian Crumb

Arthur M. Bistline
BISTLINE LAW, PLLC
1205 N. 3rd Street
Coeur d’Alene, ID 83814
Attorney for Plaintiffs/Appellants/CrossRespondents

I.
A.

REPLY ARGUMENT IN SUPPORT OF CROSS-APPELLANT’S APPEAL
Security’s allegations in their verified Complaint that Crumb is liable for breach of
contract and that Security is entitled to attorney fees in this commercial dispute are
sufficient to trigger application of Idaho Code § 12-120(3).
Security acknowledges that Garner v. Povey, 151 Idaho 462, 259 P.3d 608 (2011) “does

hold that a party alleging a commercial transaction triggers the application of Idaho Code § 12120(3) even if the transaction was not proved.” Reply Brief at 8-9.1 However, Security argue
that they did not allege a commercial transaction between Security and Crumb in their verified
Complaint. Reply Brief at 9. The record provides otherwise.
Security brought an action for breach of contract against Crumb, alleging in their verified
Complaint that “Crumb is bound by an express or implied contract with all FRITZ-HEATH
landowners to provide them access to FRITZ-HEATH through the CRUMB ENTRANCE
PARCEL”, and that “Crumb’s conduct constitutes breach of contract and/or fraud.” R. 13, § III,
¶ A (emphasis added). Security also allege in their verified Complaint that “Plaintiffs have been
required to retain the services of an attorney in this commercial dispute solely as a result of
1
See Garner, 151 Idaho at 470, 259 P.3d at 616 (“allegations in the complaint that the parties entered into a
commercial transaction and that the complaining party is entitled to recover based upon that transaction, are
sufficient to trigger the application of I.C. § 12-120(3).”); see also Intermountain Real Properties, LLC v. Draw,
LLC, 155 Idaho 313, 320, 311 P.3d 734, 741 (2013) (“In other words, when a plaintiff alleges a commercial contract
exists and the defendant successfully defends by showing that the commercial contract never existed, the court
awards the defendant attorney fees.”); Hilt v. Draper, 122 Idaho 612, 622, 836 P.2d 558, 568 (Ct. App. 1992) (where
an action was brought founded on an alleged contract within the scope of the statute, the statute applied even though
the plaintiff ultimately failed to prove the existence of the contract, and the prevailing defendant was entitled to
mandatory attorney’s fees under the statute); Miller v. St. Alphonsus Regional Medical Center, Inc., 139 Idaho 825,
87 P.3d 934 (2004) (action by physician alleging contractual right to staff privileges at hospital came under Idaho
Code § 12-120(3) even though the court holds no contractual right existed); Noak v. Idaho Dept. of Correction, 152
Idaho 305, 271 P.3d 703 (2012) (award of fees to defendant proper where complaint alleged breach of covenant of
good faith and fair dealing, but no contractual relationship was proved); Intermountain Real Properties, LLC v.
Draw, LLC, 155 Idaho 313, 311 P.3d 734 (2013) (where complaint alleged commercial transaction defendant
entitled to award of fees even though no transaction was proved); American West Enterprises, Inc. v. CNH, LLC,
155 Idaho 746, 316 P.3d 662 (2013) (defendant entitled to award of attorney fees in action where plaintiff alleged
implied warranty, even though ultimately no privity of contract, thus no warranty, was found).
1

Crumb’s incompetency, fraud, or breach of contract, and are entitled to an award of their
reasonable attorneys fees incurred in this matter.” R. 14, ¶ 15 (emphasis added). Security further
allege in their verified Complaint that “Plaintiffs have incurred damages in an amount in excess
of TEN THOUSAND DOLLARS AND NO/100 ($10,000.00) to be proved at trial.” R. 14, ¶ 16.
Security do not dispute that they alleged a breach of contract claim against Crumb in their
verified Complaint,2 and appear to acknowledge that they alleged a commercial dispute between
Security and Crumb, but argue that the allegation is not the same as alleging a commercial
transaction. Reply Brief at 9. Not surprisingly, the Idaho appellate courts have used the term
“commercial dispute” synonymously with “commercial transaction” when analyzing Idaho Code
§ 12-120(3). See Simono v. House, 160 Idaho 788, 793, 379 P.3d 1058, 1063 (2016) (“However,
because TVNA has prevailed in this commercial dispute, TVNA is entitled to attorney fees on
appeal pursuant to Idaho Code section 12-120(3).”); Eriksen v. Blue Cross of Idaho, 116 Idaho
693, 695, 778 P.2d 815, 817 (Ct.App.1989) (“We deem it clear that the Legislature put the term
‘commercial transaction’ in this statute, not to narrow its scope, but to extend its coverage to
litigation arising from commercial disputes as well as from certain non-commercial disputes.
2
The district court found that “[t]he agreement that the plaintiffs were attempting to enforce against Crumb
was a ‘Transfer of Assets and Withdrawal of Members (sic) Interest’ agreement”. R. 340. Security argued and
submitted evidence that the Member Withdrawal Agreement contractually obligated A&C LLC to provide access to
the Fritz Heath through the Crumb Parcel. Aug. 5, ¶ 15. Security now inconsistently argues that the Member
Withdrawal Agreement does not apply to A&C LLC. Reply Brief at 5. If a party alleges the existence of a contract
other than personal or household purposes, or a commercial transaction, the prevailing party is entitled to an award
of attorney fees even though no contract, liability or commercial transaction actually existed. Miller v. St. Alphonsus
Reg’l Med. Ctr., Inc., 139 Idaho 825, 839, 87 P.3d 934, 948 (2004). The Member Withdrawal Agreement is a
commercial transaction as defined by Idaho Code § 12-120(3). The Member Withdrawal Agreement contains an
attorney fees provision. R. 355. The district court found that Security’s breach of contract and fraud claims were
frivolous: “Therefore, the Court finds such claims for breach of contract and fraud to have been brought, pursued or
defended frivolously, unreasonably or without foundation.” R. 342. Thus, Crumb is entitled to an award of attorney
fees pursuant to Idaho Code § 12-120(3).

2

This intent is evinced by the Legislature’s use of the conjunctive phrase ‘and in any commercial
transaction’”); DeWils Interiors, Inc. v. Dines, 106 Idaho 288, 292-93, 94-95 678 P.2d 80, 84-85,
86-87 (Ct.App.1984). Thus, as was the case in Garner and Intermountain, Crumb is entitled to
an award of reasonable attorney fees pursuant to Idaho Code § 12-120(3) based on the
allegations in Security’s verified Complaint that they are entitled to recover attorney fees “in this
commercial dispute.” Garner, 151 Idaho at 470, 259 P.3d at 616; Intermountain, 155 Idaho at
320, 311 P.3d at 741.3 As such, the district court’s order denying attorney fees and costs to
Crumb should be reversed.
B.

Crumb is entitled to an award of attorney fees pursuant to Idaho Code § 12-121.
Security argue that although there was not an agreement between Crumb and Security,

there was an oral agreement between Crumb and A&C LLC to grant an easement. Reply Brief at
10. Security ignores the law, the facts and the findings of the district court. The law is not
debatable. Before an oral agreement to convey an interest in land will be enforced, the material
term of price or consideration must be proven by clear and convincing evidence. Bear Island

3
Security pursued this lawsuit on the basis of an alleged commercial transaction and contract. Security
submitted declaration testimony that “All FRITZ-HEATH landowners are intended beneficiaries of the express
agreement that the CRUMB ENTRANCE would be used as a permanent access to the FRITZ-HEATH”, and that the
alleged agreement was made for a commercial purpose, to make money. Aug. 9, ¶ 24. As discussed above, Security
argued and submitted evidence that the Member Withdrawal Agreement contractually obligated A&C LLC to
provide access to the Fritz Heath through the Crumb Parcel. Aug. 5, ¶ 15. The district court found that “[t]he
agreement that the plaintiffs were attempting to enforce against Crumb was a ‘Transfer of Assets and Withdrawal of
Members (sic) Interest’ agreement”. R. 340. The Member Withdrawal Agreement is a commercial transaction as
defined by Idaho Code § 12-120(3). The Member Withdrawal Agreement contains an attorney fees provision. R.
355. Security not only alleged damages in their verified Complaint, Security stated in response to discovery, under
oath, that “Security will seek at least $700,000 in damages against Brian Crumb in the event that a forty (40) foot
right of way easement is not declared over his property.” R. 150. As such, the gravamen of the lawsuit pursued by
Security, “in this commercial dispute” (R. 14, ¶ 15), was an alleged oral agreement to grant an easement, which
according to Security was to “make some money selling lots” (Aug. 9, ¶ 24) or “in order to save road construction
costs.” R. 13, § III, ¶ A. Accordingly, Crumb is entitled to an award of reasonable attorney fees pursuant to Idaho
Code § 12-120(3).
3

Water Ass’n, Inc. v. Brown, 125 Idaho 717, 722, 874 P.2d 528, 533 (1994); Hoffman v. S V Co.,
Inc., 102 Idaho 187, 190, 628 P.2d 218, 221 (1981). The parties dispute that there was an oral
agreement to grant an easement. Prior to Crumb’s withdrawal from A&C LLC on September 26,
2006, Crumb made a verbal offer to the company that upon receipt of $200,000 Crumb would
grant an easement. Crumb’s offer was never accepted, and Crumb withdrew from the company
and executed the Member Withdrawal Agreement on September 26, 2006, wherein the parties
agreed that there are no prior oral agreements between the parties.
The district court found that Security did not submit any evidence disputing that Crumb
was to be paid $200,000. R. 238. The district court further found that “Crumb never actually
received any amount of money for the easement from A&C LLC.” Id. Throughout the litigation,
Security made various self serving ever changing arguments as to consideration. However, after
reviewing all of the evidence, the district court concluded that “[Security] failed to present any
evidence tending to show that the road construction, or anything else, was ever agreed upon as
consideration in return for Crumb agreeing to grant an easement.” R. 240. “Plaintiffs still have
not pointed to any evidence in the record which proves the consideration or price term of the
alleged oral contract to grant an easement.” R. 295. At the conclusion of the case, the district
court found that Security’s attempt to enforce an easement based on breach of contract and fraud
“to be wholly without merit”. R. 342. As such, Security’s attempt to enforce an easement based
on a declaratory action, which requires the same proof - a written agreement that satisfies the
statute of frauds; or, on a claim of part performance or estoppel, proof of the material terms of an
oral contract, is likewise “wholly without merit”.

4

It is not debatable that there is no written easement. “The Court has not received any
written instrument, signed by Defendant Crumb, which both identifies the land subject to the
easement and makes clear the parties’ intention to establish a servitude.” R. 299. It is not
debatable that Crumb did not sell, transfer, or promise Security anything whatsoever. R. 106, ¶
25, 107, ¶ 29. Security could have and should have searched the records of the Kootenai County
Recorder, wherein they would have determined no easement existed over and across Crumb’s
property to Security’s lots. R. 107, ¶ 29. Security failed to simply ask Crumb if there was an
easement over and across his property to Security’s lots.4 Finally, it is not debatable that the
merger clause contained in the Member Withdrawal Agreement precludes the alleged prior oral
agreement to grant an easement. The district court found that Member Withdrawal Agreement’s
“merger clause serves as further evidence that there was no additional agreement between
Defendant Crumb and A&C LLC to grant an easement.” R. 239.5

As such, Security’s

declaratory judgment action for an easement, which required proof of a written easement, or
proof of an oral contract, the same proof as Security’s breach of contract claim which was found
by the district court to have been brought frivolously, unreasonably or without foundation,

4
Security argue that Crumb must rescind an agreement to grant an easement and sue for money damages.
Reply Brief at 10. However, there is no agreement to rescind as Crumb did not enter into an agreement to grant an
easement. R. 240, 295 and 342. Security also argues that Crumb must offer an explanation as to why a road was
constructed over the Crumb Property. Reply Brief at 10. Security does in fact have legal access to their lots. R. 116.
Security desires Crumb to grant Security with more convenient access over the Crumb Property, without any
consideration to Crumb. Regardless, Security, not Crumb, has the burden to prove an agreement to grant an
easement, including an agreement as to price and consideration, by clear and convincing evidence. Bear Island, 125
Idaho at 722, 874 P.2d at 533.
5
Security argued and submitted evidence that the Member Withdrawal Agreement contractually obligated
A&C LLC to provide access to the Fritz Heath through the Crumb Parcel. Aug. 5, ¶ 15. The district court found that
“[t]he agreement that the plaintiffs were attempting to enforce against Crumb was a ‘Transfer of Assets and
Withdrawal of Members (sic) Interest’ agreement”. R. 340. Security now inconsistently argues that the Member
Withdrawal Agreement does not apply to A&C LLC. Reply Brief at 5.
5

should have been likewise so found. R. 342; Idaho Code § 12-121. As such, the district court’s
order denying attorney fees and costs to Crumb should be reversed.
C.

Crumb is entitled to attorney fees and costs on appeal.
For the reasons set forth in Crumb’s opening brief and above, Crumb is entitled to

attorney fees and costs before the district court and on appeal.
II.

CONCLUSION

Based on the foregoing, Crumb respectfully requests that this Court affirm the district
court’s Judgment dismissing Security’s Complaint with prejudice, reverse the district court’s
decision denying Crumb’s attorney fees and costs, and award Crumb attorney fees and costs
before the district court and on appeal.
DATED this 14th day of December, 2018.
MURPHEY LAW OFFICE, PLLC
By
/s/ Darrin L. Murphey
Darrin L. Murphey,
Attorney for Defendant/ Respondent/
Cross-Appellant Brian Crumb
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the 14th day of December, 2018, I electronically filed the
foregoing with the Clerk of the Court using the File and Serve system which sent an email to the
email address that was identified as the party's service contact as indicated below:

Arthur M. Bistline
Bistline Law, PLLC
1205 N. 3rd Street
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83814
US.MAIL
HAND DELIVERED
OVERNIGHT MAIL
_ TELECOPY (FAX) to: (208) 665-7290
X iCourt: service@bistlinelaw.com

By
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Isl Darrin L. Murphey
Darrin L. Murphey

